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RECAP: Cloud Peak Energy v. State Department of Revenue: Finding
an “Apples to Apples” Comparison For the Market Value of Coal in
Non-Arm’s Length Transactions
Brianne McClafferty
No. DA 14-0057
Montana Supreme Court
Oral Argument: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 at 9:30 a.m. in the
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice
Building, Helena, Montana. The matter was taken into advisement at
about 10:45 a.m.
I. BRENDEN R. BEATTY FOR THE PETITIONER
Brendan Beatty began his argument by encouraging the court to
focus on three seemingly simple words “time of sale.” Beatty argued the
time of sale of coal in Montana, is when the coal is severed from the
earth and placed onto a railcar f.o.b. mine.1 He argues this is the
appropriate time to approximate market value for imputation of revenue
purposes. Beatty asked the Court not to muddle through in the extensive
briefing and facts involved in the case, but rather view the issue as a
matter of law and decide the term “time of sale,” as contemplated in
Decker Coal Company v. Department of Revenue,2 to be when coal is
prepared for shipment.
Several Justices sought clarification from Beatty on what point
the price of coal is actually set, as they seemed to believe the price is set
at the time of contract rather than at the time the coal is loaded onto the
train. Beatty agreed, and explained the base price is set when an arm’s
length contract is entered into, but the value is adjusted for additives and
thus the exact price is not known until the transfer at the railcar occurs.
Then Justice Shea explained the Court’s “bottom line” is to find a
methodology which “compares apples to apples.” He pointed out it
seemed the Department’s favored methodology, which compares actual
sales prices, as opposed to negotiated arm’s length agreement prices, to
determine market value of NAL agreements, would result in “inevitable
disparity.” While Beatty conceded the Department’s method may result
in a disparity in some instances, he argued that issue was one for the
legislature to decide.
1
Oral Argument Audiofile, Cloud Peak Energy v. State Department of Revenue, (Mont. Sept. 26,
2014)(No. DA 14-0057).
2
Decker Coal Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2 P.3d 245 (Mont. 2000).
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Before changing gears to address the cross appeal issue, Beatty
addressed what the Department sees as a possible evil of Clod Peak
Energy’s (“CPE”) interpretation. He argued, if the Court adopted CPE’s
interpretation, CPE could enter into artificially low contracts, by waiting
until the “bottom falls out of the coal market and arm’s length
transactions are lower.” At this time, he argued, CPE could lock-in a low
arm’s length market price for the company’s NAL contracts. He argued
the Department’s method would prevent these “suspect transactions.”
Beatty concluded on this issue by driving home the point he made in the
beginning of his time, arguing the Montana Supreme Court has already
decided coal is sold when it is extracted and prepared for shipment f.o.b
mine, not when a piece of paper (agreement) is signed.
Pivoting to respond to CPE’s cross appeal on additives, Beatty
argued the administrative rule cited by the Respondent which eliminated
a reference to “further processing” only applied to refined coal, which is
not at issue here. He also argued the District Court was correct in
determining the statute merely clarified the Department’s existing
practice of including other costs as part of the coal’s value and the
“prepared for shipment” language in the old statute meant the values for
additives should be included in the price.
II. KYLE ANN GRAY FOR THE RESPONDENT
Kyle Gray began her argument explaining a rule of construction
applied to tax statutes: when there is doubt in the meaning of a tax
statute, the doubt is resolved in favor of the taxpayer and strictly
construed against the Department. Gray distinguished this statutory rule
of construction from the burden of proof CPE carries as the contesting
party, which she argues was met in Judge Sherlock’s District Court.
Gray then suggested the Department was “dancing around the
holding” in Decker Coal Company, pointing out the dissent in that case
actually concluded the sale occurred when coal was loaded onto the train.
Quoting Justice Shea, Gray argued, the Court must “compare apples to
apples,” and adopting the Department’s interpretation, ignores the fact
that coal is an interchangeable commodity in the sense that one train car
may contain coal from numerous contracts, entered into at different
times, with different prices. Gray argued using market price at time of
shipping, rather than the price of negotiated arm’s length contracts when
determining the price for NAL contracts is like comparing “apples to
bananas.” Pointing out the statutory language does not include “time of
sale,” but rather instructs the Department to find “market value,” Gray
assured the Court the most logical, relevant way to determine a NAL
contract’s market value is to use contemporaneous negotiated arm’s
length contracts. She argued this method makes sense because that is
when the market forces are the same for both types of contracts.
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Toward the end of her argument, Gray was asked to address the
possible evil Beatty brought up in his argument—CPE’s ability to
artificially manipulate the price of coal by renegotiating NAL
agreements when the market has “bottomed out.” Gray responded by
saying she “never understood that argument” because it assumes CPE
would keep its prices low and take less than what it could get for coal in
arm’s length transactions.
Before moving onto the additives issue on cross appeal, Gray
argued where there is a NAL contract for coal the Department must
impute the market value f.o.b. mine. To do that, and achieve an “apples
to apples comparison,” she argues the Department cannot ignore the
most relevant comparison—the time of sale comparison which is the
arm’s length negotiated contract.
Addressing CPE’s cross appeal, Gray argued the legislature’s
purpose in amending the statute at issue3 was to clarify an inconsistently
applied Department practice and since the statute was applied
inconsistently the pre-2009 statute should be construed in favor of the
taxpayer. Before running out of time, Gray stressed that by interpreting
the earlier version of the statute as containing language only present in
the 2009 amended version, the Court would essentially be writing out the
statute’s applicability date.
III. PREDICTION
Both interpretations of the statute have obvious merits, making
the Justices’ decision difficult. However, in trying to find an “apples to
apples comparison” for market value of NAL contracts, the Justices
seemed persuaded by Respondent’s arguments for utilizing
contemporaneous arm’s length sales contracts. On the additives issue, the
Justices seemed persuaded the words “prepared for shipment” in the
previous statute’s language should be given meaning, and thus the value
of additives should be included in price. This author predicts the Court
will affirm the District Court’s ruling on both issues.

Lower Court: Lewis and Clark County Cause No. BDV2012-239,
Honorable Jeffery M. Sherlock, District Court Judge of the First Judicial
District, Lewis and Clark County.
Attorneys for the Petitioner: Brendan R. Beatty and Courtney Jenkins,
Special Assistant Attorneys General, Montana Department of Revenue.

3

See Mont. Code Ann. § 15–35–102 (2013).
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Attorneys for the Respondent: Robert L. Sterup and Kyle Anne Gray,
Holland & Hart L.L.P., Billings, Montana.

